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T'H

PHYSICIAN AS AN EXPBRT

XPEPT evidence is evidence of a scientific or technical character in regard to a matter that is outside the domain of
ordinary experience and knowledge. The evidence is usually in
the form of opinions or conclusions based upon facts that for the
purposes of an opinion are assumed to be true, although it may be
in regard to scientific facts. The expert is one who has had special
training or opportunities in a particular subject that the ordinary
witness has not enjoyed, and who has thereby acquired certain
habits of judgment.that render his explanations and opinions in the
field of his specialty valuable as guides and worthy of considera-

tion.-'
It is by virtue of an exception to a fundamental rule of evidence
that the opinions of experts are received, the rule beingthat witnesses
must state facts and not conclusions that they draw from facts.
Ordinarily it is the province of the jury to consider the facts in the
case and, uninfluenced by 'the opinions of witnesses, draw such
inferences therefrom as their judgment may dictate. But in cases
involving questions outside of the ordinary range of inquiry, in
which correct conclusions can be drawn from the facts only by
means of scientific deductions, it is apparent that most jurors would
be unable to perform the functions that the law imposes upon them,
unless aided in their deliberations by the judgment and opinions of
-witnesses skilled and experienced in the subject under investigation. And so, while the law does not look with favor upon the
I See Dole v.3ohnson,50 N. .452; Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546. Ia this case the court
speaking through Judge Doe says:---"*rperts may give their opinions Upon questions of
science, skill or trade, or others of the like kind, or when the subject-matter of inquiry is
such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of formlnga correctjudrmeat upon itwithout such assistance, or when it so far liartakes of the nature of a science as
to require a course of previous habit or study, in order to the attainment of a knowledge of
it;and the opinions of experts are not admissible when the inquiry is into a subject-matter,
the nature of which is not such as to require any Peculiar habits or study in order to qualify
amantounderstand I." Struthers v. The Philadelphia and Delaware County Railroad
Company, 174 Pa. St. 291. In this case the court defines an expert as follows:---"An expert is
a person experienced, trained, skilled in some particular business or subject. An expert
witness is one who, because of the possession of knowledge not within ordinary reach, is
specially qualified to speak upon the subject to which his attention is called." In Heald w.
Thing, 45 Me. 392,394. an expert is defined as being "a skillful or experienced person; a person having skill, experience or peculiar knowledge on certain subjects or in certain professions: a scientific witness."
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giving of opinions or conclusions by witnesses, it permit, it in
certain cases, where it is apparent that such a course is necessary
to the proper administration of justice. "The general rule
undoubtedly is," says the supreme court of the United States,
"that witnesses are restricted to proof of facts within their personal
knowledge, and may not express their opinion oi judgment as to
matters which the jury or the court are required to determine, or
which must constitute elements in such determination. To this
rule there is a well established exception in the case of witnesses
having special kno*ledge or skill in the business, art, or science,
the principles of which are involved in the issue to be tried."'
The testimony of the expert is admitted upon the theory that in the
particular case the issue is such that the jurors are not competent to
draw their own conclusions from the facts without his aid. The
purpose of his testimony is to inform the jurors as to the significance of the facts involved in the inquiry, and thus to aid them in
reaching correct conclusions. 2 The opinions of the expert should
I Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.Lathrop. 11 U. S. 612. 618.
2 In Muldowney v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 36 Iowa. 462,473. the court gives the following as a governing rule: "that the opinion of witnesses possessing peculiar skill is admissible. whenever the subject of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove
capable of forming a correct judgment upon it without such assistance; in otherwords,
when it so far partakes of the nature of a science as to require a course of previohs habit
or study, in order to the attainment of a knowledge of it; and that the opinions of witnesses
cannot be received when the inquiry is into a subject-matter the nature of which is not such
as to require any peculiar habits or study. in order to qualify a man to understand it." See,
also. Hamilton v. Des Moines Valley F_ R.. Co.. 36 Iowa. 31. 36. Upon this subject the
supreme court of Pennsylvania uses the following language: "in the examination of
experts it is only necessary to keep constantly in view that their proper office is to instruct
the court and jury in matters so far removed from the ordinary pursuits of life that accurate
knowledge of them can only be acquired by continued study and experience; the purpose is
to enable both court and jury to judge intelligently of the force and application of the facts
introduced in evidence, as theywould have been able to do if they hadbeen persons properly instructed upon the subjects involved." Coyle v.Commonwealth, 104 Penn. St. 117,131.
The design of expert testimony, according to the supreme court of Massachusetts. is "to aid
the judgment of the jury in regard to the influence and effect of certain facts which lie out of
the observation and experience of persons in general." Commonwealth v. Rogers. 7 Met.
(Mass.) 500. 505. See further upon the subject: Milwaukee, etc. P.. Co. v. Xellogg, 94 U.S.
469.472,473; St. Louis. etc.. I. Co. v. Parr. 12 U. S. App. 520; Grigsby v. Clear Lake Water
Works Co., 40 Cal. 396. 405; Indiana, Bloomington and Western R'y Co. v. Hale, 93 Ind. 79. 31;
City of Parsons v. Lindsay. 26 Xans. 426.432* Snow v. Boston & Me. R. R., 65 Me. 230; Page v.
Parker. 40 X. H. 47.59; Koccis v. State, 56 1.. Law. 44. The supreme court of Connecticut
holds that the true test as to the admissibility of expert testimony. "is not whether the
subject-matter is common or uncommon, or whether many persons or few have some
knowledge of the matter; but it is whether the witnesses offered as experts have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the world, which renders their opinion founded
on such knowledge or experience any aid to the court or the jury in determining the questons at issue." Taylor v. The Town of Monroe. 43 Conn.36. 43.
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be considered by the jury as facts, for they are essentially conclusions of fact to which his knowledge, observation and judgment
have led him.
The functions of the expert are in a sense judicial and should be
so regarded by him. He is called into the case, in theory at least,
not as a partisan or advocate, but to aid the jury by his opinions in
reaching correct results. The fact that the jury are.not bound to
be governed by what he says, i no.way relieves him of responsibility or changes his relation to the controversy. Although a witness whose testimony is to be considered by the jury like that of
any other witness, he'should always maintain the judicial attitude.
The frequent failure of the expert to do this is undoubtedly the
cause of much of the unfavorable comment' from the bench in
regard to this class of testimony, and has served perhaps more than
anything else ter bring the expert witness into disrepute. It is
apparent that the bias of experts prompted the following from the
supreme court of Michigan: "An examination of the record discloses that this woman was convicted upon the evidence of medical
experts,-upon the opinions of men who never saw William Vanderhoof while he was alive. It is -also apparent, with one or two
exceptions, that these experts were biased against the respondent,
and used their learning and ability, it is to be hoped unconsciously,
to forward and aid the cause of the prosecution. This case illustrates most forcibly the dangerous character of expert testimony,
which has go often been called to the attention of the courts and
challenged by them."' This same court in another case suggests
that in all important litigations, where expert testimony is proper,
the experts are to be found arrayed against each other.2 In speaking of experts the supreme court of California suggests that they
"should be selected by the court and should be impartial as well
as learned and skillful
.
.
. It must be painfully evident to
every practitioner," continues the court, "that these witnesses are
generally but adroit advocates of the theory'upon which the party
calling them relies, rather than impartial ex.perts upon whose superior judgment and learning the jury can safely rely. Jven men of
the highest character and integrity are apt to be prejudiced in favor
I People v. Vanderhoof. 71 Ifich. 158,167,168.

Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459, 502, In the later case of Prentiss v. Bates. 88 3fich.
567, 592, the court says that, "it must not be forgotten that in all cases of importance it is
the unfortunate fact thatwe find these experts arrayed against each other."
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of the party by whom they are employed. And, as a matter of
course, no expert is called until the party calling him is assured
that his opinion will be favorable.,, 1 "The unsatisfactory nature
of such evidence," says the supreme court of Wisconsin, "is well
known. The facility with which great numbers of witnesses may
be marshalled on both sides of such a question, all calling themselves experts, and each anxious to display his skill and ingenuity
in detecting the false or pointing out the true, and equally honest
and confident that his own theory or opinion is the correct one,
and yet all on one side directly opposing all on the other, admonishes us of the fallibility of such testimony, and of the great degree
of allowance with which it must be received.' '2 "All persons who
have had much experience in jury trials," says IAWRBNcB, J., of
the supreme court of Illinois, "'must have noticed how apt are
witnesses called as experts, to speak with great confidence, when
seeking to ascertain the unknown cause of certain effects by appearances which to others c6nvey little meaning. Such evidence is
often valuable, but as it relates to matters of theory and opinion
merely, it is entitled to less weight when the witnesses are so circumstanced that they have a strong interest in propounding one
opinion or theory rather than another."13 "My own experience,"
says Mr. Justice Mmz:,., "both in the local courts and in the
supreme court of the United States, is that, whenever the matter
in contest involves an immense sum in value, and where the
question turns mainly upon opinions of experts, there is no difficulty in introducing any amount of them on either side." 4
This class of testimony must always be subject to criticisms like
the foregoing, and can never occupy the place or exert the influence that its real importance demands, so long as the expert persists
so frequently in taking the part of an advocate instead of exercising the quasi-judicial function that the law imposes. To command
the respect that his position as an authority should bring to him,
the expert must become in practice what he is in theory, an aid
to the court and jury in the interpretation of facts and the discovery of truth without regard to the effect that his testimony may
I Grigsby

v. Clear Lake Water Co., 40 CaL 396.405.

2 Daniels v. Foster. 26 Wis. 686, 693.
3 Chiergo & Alton R.R. Co. v. Shannon. 43 M. 338.343.344.

4 Middlings PurifierCompanyv. Christian. 4 Dillon 448,459.
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have upon the interests of either party to the controversy. So long
as the present method of selecting and paying experts continues,
but little change for the better can probably be expected. The
change will undoubtedly come when the expert is appointed and
paid as an officer of the court and is by law made a part of the
judicial machinery of the state.
But even under the changed conditions suggested, the testimony
of the expert would not probably, in all cases, receive the consideration that should be given to it. Usually expert testimony is in
the form of a personal opinion or judgment in regard to the significance of a given state of facts. When of this character, its very
nature is suh as to excite doubt and invite criticism; its inherent
qualities are such as tend to defeat the object for which it is introduced. The ordinary juror, knowing that he is not bound by the
testimony, is inclined to reject it altogether. There is certainly
force. in the suggestion that it is "the inherent vice-of an opinion
that it can never be conclusive, but is whollyeat the mercy of the
jury to accept or reject as they please.' ' Furthermore the testimony of the expert, and particularly of the medical expert, must
always suffer somewhat from the fact that there is inevitably more
or less conflict in opinion by reason of the changes that modern
reseaich is developing. A radical change in theory can never meet
with universal approval. Among experts we will always have the
conservative and the advanced. The conflict between the old and
the new must always introduce an element of confusion and
uncertainty.
But notwithstanding the criticisms upon expert testimony and the
fact that there are in it inherent weaknesses, and notwithstanding
the uncertainty as to its practical value by reason of the unknown
attitude of the jury, in many cases, and particularly in those
involving medical questions, a resort to it is absolutely necessary.
The law governing the testimony of the phy'sician as an expert is
of large practical importance to both legal and medical professions.
Before expert testimony can be introduced, certain preliminary
questions must be settled by the court. It must be determined first
whether the subject-matter of the inquiry lies within the field of
the expert. And if this is found to be the case, the court must
then determine as to the qualifications of the person who is offered
2 American Law Rerister (New Series). vol. 32. v. 531.
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as an expert.' This is done by means of a preliminary inquiry,
usually in the form of an examination and cross-examination by
the counsel of the respective parties, conducted on the one side
with a view of showing to the court the competency of the party
offered and on the other with a view of showing limitations in
learning or experience or both of such a nature as should lead the
court to reject the party as an expert.2 The ruling of the trial
court upon this question of competency to testify as an expert is
generally regarded as conclusive and not subject to review, unless
it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion 3
I '".When a witness is offered as an expert," says the court in .ones v. Tucker, 41 X. H.
546.547, "three questions necessarily arise: 1. Is the subject concerning which he is to
testify, one upon which the opinion of an expert can be received? 2. What are the qualifications necessary to entitle a witness to testify as an expert? Z. Has the witness those qualifications? . . . The rule determining the subjects upon which experts may testify and the
rule prescribing the qualifications of experts are matters of law. but whether a witness
offered as an expert has those qualifications, is a question of fact to be decidedby the court
at the trial." The opinion of the witness himself as to his qualifications as an expert is
entirely immaterial. See Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120.135; Gates v. Chicago & Alton
P. Co.. 44 Mo. App. 488.492.
2 It should be noted that the practice in regard to this preliminary exaination is not
uniform. While that suggested above seems to be logical and proper and is. perhaps, generally followed, it is the practice of some courts not to allow a preliminary cross-examination butto give the opposing counsel the opportunity to test the competency of the witness
when he cross-examines upon the merits. See Sarle v. Arnold, 7 P. I. 582; City of Fort
Waynev. Coombs,107 nd. 75, 85; Drewv. Beall,6211L164,166. Upon thissubjectthesupreme
court of Minnesota uses the following language: "Whether a witness is qualified to give an
opinion is to be decided by the court, as a question of fact, before the witness shall be permitted to state his opinion. It would seem, logically, that, before deciding it, all the evidence bearing on the question, whether brought out by direct or cross-examination, should
be taken. That would certainly be so if the decision permitting the opinion to be given
were final and conclusive that the witness is qualified, so that the jury are bound to take
the opinion as that of an expert. The general p'ractice is for the opposing party to exercise
his right of cross-examination on the matter of qualification after the witness has been
examined in full by the party offering him. That is the more convenient practice. And
we think it is the understanding of the judges and the bar that while the court may, in its
discretion, permit a preliminary cross.examination, it is not bound to do so. but may allow
the opinion to be given, when 'the direct examination shows prima face that the witness is
qualified." Finch v. Chicago. Milwaukee & St. Paul lI. Co.. 46 Minn. 250.252.253.
5
Stillwell Mfg. Co. v. Phelps. 110 U. S. 520.527. Howland v. Oakland Consol, St. R. Co.
110 Cal.513. 42 Pac.Fep.983; Dole v. Johnson.50 N.H. 452; Insurance Co. v. Ross Lewin,24 Col.
43,65 Am. St. Rep. 215. 51 Pac. Rep. 488; Sorg v. First German Congregation. 63 Pa. St. 156.
161; Stevenson v. 3bervale Coal Co., 203 Pa. St. 316, 330. 331: 1ureka Block Coal Co. v.
Wells, 29 Ind. App. 1., 94 Am. St. Rep. 259; City of Fort Wayne v. Coombs. 107 Ind. 75;
State z,. Cole, 94 N. C. 958; Fayette v. Chesterville, 77 Me. 28; Perkins. v Stickney, 132 Mass.
217: Schmuck v. Hill (Nebi. 96 N. W. Rep. 158: Greenleaf on 3vidence (16th ed.), 9 430 f. and
note in which numerous cases are cited.
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Although not often done, there is no objection to the calling of
witnesses other than the expert offered, for the purpose of showing
the qualifications of the expert. "Any evidence," says the supreme
court of Iowa, "tending to shovw that the witness called as an
expert possesses the requisite knowledge and skill, is, we think,.
admissible for what it is worth.' ' After the court has determined
that a witness is competent to testify as an expert, it is proper for
the attorneys of both parties in the examination and cross-examination upon the merits to ask ffirther questions as to competency
with a view of aiding the jury in determining as to the weight to
be given to the evidence. 2 If it happen that a proper foundation
for expert evidence has not been laid, the error will be cured, if,
subsequently, upon cross-examination, the competency of the witness appear. 3 This preliminary question as to competency is one
that must be determined by the court upon evidence submitted, like
any other issue of fact. The personal knowledge of the presiding
judge cannot take the place of evidence; nor can the court properly
waive the trial of the question on the ground that the same witness
on a former trial between other parties was permitted to testify to
the same matter. The "issue is to be tried and determined the
same as if the witness in question had never before been used as an
expert and the same as if the evidence given in court on the trial of
that issue gave the members of the court all the personal knowl4
edge they have of his qualifications as an expert.
This preliminary question of competency is easy of solution when
the witness offered is a physician or surgeon who has come into
the profession through the regular channels, for it is the generally
recognized practice to permit any medical man who has been
legally licensed, to testify as an expert in regard to any matter that
lies properly within the field of his profession. The fact that he
has been duly licensed to practice appearing, the court will at once
pronounce him qualified to speak as an expert. The question of
competency is settled when the regularity of the license of the witness has been shown to the satisfaction of the trial judge. 5 But it
I See State v. Maynes, 61 Iowa 119, 120; Mason v. Phelps, 48 Mich. 126. 132; Meadum v.
Commonwealth, 6 Rand. (Va.) 704.
- Andre v. Hardin. 32 Mich. 324.
3 Crich v. Williamsburg City Itire Insurance Co.. 45 Minn. 441, 443,48 N. W. 198.
4 Fire Association of Philadelphia v,. Merchants' National Bank of St. Zohnsbury, 52 VL
83,85. See, also. Polk v. The State, 36 Ark. 117,123.
6 Hathaway v. National Life VIs. Co., 48 Vt. 335, 351; Siebert v. People, 143 l. 571, 579;
Seckinger v. Mfg. Co.. 129 Mo. 590. 606: Hardiinanv. Brown. 162 Mass. 585: Olmsted a. Gere,
100 Pa. St. 127; Livingston v. The commonwealth, 14 Gratt. 592.
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-should be noted that the extent of the knowledge, experience and
skill of the witness may be subsequently tested upon cross-examinntion, not for the purpose of raising the question of competency,
but with a view of discrediting his testimony with the jury.1 The
law does not recognize any one school of medicine to the exclusion
of others, 2 therefore in proving the qualifications of the medical
expert, it is not necessary to show that he has been educated
according to the principles of any particular school. If it appear
that he has been duly authorized to practice medicine according to
the principles of any one of the recognized schools or systems, the
-qualification will be regarded by the court as sufficient.
Where the person offered as a medical expert is not a regular
-practitioner, duly licensed, the question of his competency may be
one of some difficulty. According to some authorities, it is not
absolutely necessary to his competency that he should be a physician or that he should have studied for the profession. It has been
held, for example, that a hospital nurse of twenty-one years of
experience in general hospital work, including attendance upon the
surgical operations in the hospital, performed upon men, is competent to testify for what disease an operation which he witnessed
was performed.8 The supreme court of California has held that a
Roman Catholic priest, under the circumstances disclosed in the
case, might properly testify as an expert concerning the mental
,condition of a party. It appeared in evidence that it had been a
part of the priest's preliminary education to become fitted to pass
upon the mental condition of persons seeking the sacraments of the
church, and that for years he had been constantly exercising that
-duty. In speaking of this witness and his qualifications, the court
said: "It was a part of his collegiate education, and it was especially a matter of daily practice with him for ten years to familiarize
himself with the mental condition of persons upon whom he wis
4called to attend in his character as a priest; and it does seem to us
that, from both education and experience, he was peculiarly qualified to express an opinion, as an expert, on the question of mental
1 Challis v.Lake,71 N. E.

90.94.

- Corsi -. Waretzek, 4 R. 3D.Smith (N. Y.) 1; White
,.Carroli. 42 N.Y. 161; Bowman v.
Woods, 1. Greene (Iowa), 441.

3 Lund v. Pasonic Ass'n. of western New York, 88 X. Y. Sup. C't PL 287. 30 N. Y.
Supp. 725.
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diseases." I It has been held that a medical student who has pursued his studies for some time under the direction of a practitioner,
practiced under his direction and in his company, and who thereafter studied medicine in a, university and while there saw an&
treated at the hospital many cases of the disease in question, is.
competent to testify as an expert that a partjr was suffering from
the particular disease. 2 It has been held that a woman who has.
had experience as a nurse in childbirth, but who has not read
medicine and has no knowledge upon the subject excepting what
she has gained from her experience as nurse, may give expert testimony as to whether the birth of a child was premature. "Thew
witness," says the court, "by her experience and observation,
appears to have acquired knowledge of the subjects about which.
she was testifying that persons generally do not have. To the
extent of this particular knowledge, she was a person of skill and
science, and her opinion, founded upon it, was evidence competent
to go to the jury." 3 In the case cited below it appeared that the
partyoffered as a medical expert was not a graduate of a medical
college and had no license to practice, but that he was actually in
practice, that he had attended one course of medical lectures, andhad studied the science three years before he began his practice.
The supreme court held the ruling of the trial court admitting the'
witness as a medical expert to be correct. 4 It is probably the law
at the present time, in the absence of soine statute changing it,
that graduation from a recognized medical college and possession.
of a license to practice are not nedessary qualifications for the'
I ]state of'oomes, 54 Cal. 509. See also, Commonwealth v. Wireback, 190 PaFSt. 138, 42"
At. Rtep. 542.
2 State n. Dixon. 47 34a. Ann. 1. "It is true." said the court in this case that "the witness.
bad not as yet received a diploma or been licensed to practice medicine, but while this fact
would be important for certain purposes, itwould not of itself disqualify the witness necessarily. A person other than a licensed physician (for instance, trined nurses in the charityhospital). may have such knowledge of a particular disease as to make their statements.
regarding its existence and its stage and state of progress thoroughly reliable."
3 Mason v. Fuller. 45 Vt. 29. But see Osborne v. Troup. 60 Conn. 485. where a nurse was
held not competent to testify as an expert on account of lack of education in medicine and
training as a nurse and for the further reason that her knowledge in regard to the matter in
issue was only that which any person of ordinari' intelligence might, under similar circumstances, have had. See, also Allen v. Vole. 114 'Wis. 1, 13.

4 New Orleans, etc. 1. Co. v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242. 25 Am. Dec. 98.
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medical expert.' The New York court of appeals, as is evident
from the following quotation, regards this as the law: "After a careful consideration of the subject," says the court, "we have reached
the conclusion that if a man be in reality an expert upon any given
subject belonging to the domain of medicine, his opinion may be
received by the court, although he has not a license to practice
medicine. But such testimony should be received with great caution, and only after the trial court has become fully satisfied that
upon the subject as to which the witness is called for the purpose
of giving an opinion, he is fully competent to speak." 2 It goes
without saying that expert testimony from medical witnesses of
this class would ordinarily have less weight with the jury than the
same kind of testimony from regularly licensed practitioners. In
Wisconsin the matter has been the subject of legislative enactment,
and it is provided that "no person practicing physic or surgery, or
both, shall have the right

.

.

.

.

to testify in a professional

capacity as a physician or surgeon in any case unless he," before
a date named, shall have "received a diploma from some incorporated medical society or college, or shall, since said date, have
received a license from the state board of medical examiners." 3
The wisdom of this legislation is apparent. It does away with the
danger of too great liberality by trial courts in admitting opinion
evidence by a class of witnesses whose preparation to give opinions
may be open to serious question, and whose testimony, according
to the foregoing quotation from the New York court of appeals,
should always be received with great caution.
In order that a party may be competent to testify as a medical
expert, it is not necessary that he should, at the time he is called, be
in the active practice of his profession. The fact that he is not in
full practice does not bear upon the question of qualification, but is
2 NewOrleans. etc. I. Co. v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242.75 Am.

lee. 98; State v. SpeakS. 94

N1. C. 865; State v. Merriman. 34 S.C.16. 36, 12S. n. Rep. 619,626; Tullis v. Xidd. 12 Ala.
648; Stone v. Moore. 83 Iowa, 186.49 N. W. Rep. 76; People W.Rice. 159 N. Y. 400,410.
2 People v. Rice. 159 NT. .400, 410.
3 Wisconsin Statutes. 1898. Vol. 1, See. 1436. It has been held that this statute applies
only in cases where physicians or surgeons are called upon to testify as exp#er&s. Montgomery v. The Town of Scott,34Wis.338. The conpetency of a witness under this statute
may be proved by his own oral testimony without the production of his diploma or of
record evidence of the incorporation of the college or societv which granted it. McDonald
v. The City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 251. See also. Rider v. Ashland County. 87 Wis. 160,164. and
Allen v. Voie. 114 Wis, 1. where this statute is considered.
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rather a matter for the consideration of the jury in determining what
weight should be given to the opinion of the witness.' But it should
be noted that the supreme court of Vermont has suggested that the
mere fact that a person is by education a physician would not, in
the absence of any practice of the profession by him, be deemed a
sufficient qualification to justify his admission as an expert.2
It is quite generally held that the competency of the physician to
testify as an expert does not depend upon the fact 'of his having
seen or treated in his practice a case similar to the one under investigation. He may be competent eVen though his knowledge has
been gained entirely from books. For example, it has been held by
the supreme court of Massachusetts that a practicing physician in
good standing and of long experience, who knows what the authorities say in regard to tumors, may properly testify as to a tumor of
the brain being the exciting cause of the sickness of a patient,
although in his practice he has not met with tumors on the brain,
and does not pretend to understand the cause of tumors. "A doctor of medicine," says this court, "may be competent to express an
opinion upon the effect of pressure at the base of the brain, whether
it arises from tumors or other causes, although he may never have
been called to a case where tumors were known to exist there; and
in determining the qualifications of a physician, the extent of his
reading in his profession may be considered, as well as his experience." 3 The supreme court of Colorado held it to be error for
a trial court to reject as an expert, in a case involving poisoning by
cyanide of potassium, a regularly licensed physician of large experience who had made toxicology a special study for years, and who
had been a lecturer and teacher in the subject, because of lack of
experience with poisoning of this kind.4 In discussing this question, the supreme court of North Carolina held that a practicing
physician might properly give iis opinion as an expert, although
it appeared not only thata like case hadnotfallen under his observaI Roberts v.Johnson, 58 N.Y. 613; Stone v. Moore. 83 Iowa, 186,49 N. W. Rep. 76. In
this case a woman doctor who had attended a regular medical school and practiced medicine in the regular way fora fewyears, butwilo had abandoned regular practice, and adopted
the so.called "Christian Science" as a method of healing, was held competent to testify as
an expert as to the result of her examination of the plaintiff and as to the symptoms of
which plaintiff complained. See, also, Tullis v.
midd, 12 Ala. 648.
-

Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 VL 398,409. 410.

S Hardiman v. Brown. 162 Mass. 585.

4 Insurance Co. v. Ross Lewin, 24 Col. 43. 65 Am. St. Rep. 215,51 Pac. Rep. 488.
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tion, but also that he had never read of such a case.
"It is the
province of science," said the court, "to discover general principles from long and accurate observation and sound reasoning; and
it must be sufficient to induce courts of justic to receive assistance
from men of science in making their investigations when assured by
them that the principles of their science, applicable to a particular
subject of inquiry, establish certain results, even though the witness
may not have seen or read of a case in all its particulars like that
under consideration.' I The cases cited in the note will be found
to support the general proposition that practical experience is not a
necessary qualification for the medical expert.? It should however,
be noted that in some jurisdictions the contrary opinion seems to
prevail. Por example, the supreme court of Wisconsin has held
that a physician in general practice, whose knowledge of arsenical
poisoning has been gained wholly from the reading of scientific
works and from instruction received while a student of medicine,
cannot properly testify as an expert as to the symptoms of such
poisoning. The conclusion of the court is apparently based upon
the proposition that a witness whose knowledge has been gained in
this way would in his testimony simply repeat what he has read or
been told.
"The testimony of such medical witnesses," says the
court, "is at best merely hearsay,-what medical books and teachers taught or told them, repeated from memory."13 A physician who
had been inpracticefor several years, but who had had no experience
as to the effect upon health that comes from the breathing of illuminating gas, was held by the Massachusetts supreme court not
qualified to speak as an expert upon the subject.
The mere fact
that the witness "was a physician," said the court, "would not
prove that he had any knowledge of gas without further proof as
to his experience; for it is notorious that many ,persons practice
medicine who are without learning; and a physician may have much
I State v. Clark. 12 Ired. Law, L51, 155. 156.
2Hathaway v.1qational Life Ins.Co.48 Vt.335; Johnson v.Castle,63 Vt.452, 21 AtI.Rep. 534;
Siebertv .People, 143 In.571; Healy v. Visalia & T. R. Co. 101 Cal 585, 36 Pac. ReD. 125; city
of Jackson v. Boone, 93 Ga.662, 20 S.3. Rep. 46; State v. Terrell. 12 Rich. Law (S. cJ 321;
Castner v.Sliker, 33 X. J. Law, 95,507; Brown v. Marshall, 47 Mich. 576; Marshall t'v. Brown,
50 Mich. 148; Xelly v. United States. 27 Fed. Rep. 616: Taylor v. Grand Trunk I. R,. Co. 4S
N. H. 304; State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484; People v. Phelan, 123 Cal. 551.
S Soquet v. The State, 72 Wis. 659. in which Boyle v. The State. 57 Wis. 472 is cited
and followed.

HeinOnline -- 2 Mich. L. Rev. 612 1903-1904

THE PHYSICIANAS AN EXPERT

professional learning without being acquainted with the propetties
of gas, or its effect on health."'
It should be observed,
however, that the same court in a subsequent case reaches
the conclusion that a physician, whose general competency.
as an expert is not questioned, may give expert testimony
as to the effect of inhaling gas, although it appears that he
has not had experience with this kind of asphyxiation. "Although
it might not be admissible," says the court, "merely to repeat what
a witness had read in a book not itself admissible, still, when
one who is competent on the general subject accepts from
his reading as probably true a matter of detail which he has not
verified, the fact gains an authority which it would not have had
from the printed page alone, and, subject perhaps to the exercise ofsome discretion, may be admitted." 2 It has been held by the
supreme court of Mississippi that a physician will not be qualified
to speak as an expert where upon the preliminary inquiry a license
to practice and a large general experience are shown, if it also
appears that he has never made a study of the subject in regard to
which he is called to testify and further that he has had no practi;cal experience in connection with the subject.
"The asking of
hypothetical questions," says the court, "upon a presumed state of
facts, for the purpose of eliciting the opinion of a witness, can be"
justified only upon the theory that the witness is so familiar with
the general characteristics of the subject under discussion as to be
able to form opinions worthy of consideration, even though wholly
ignorant of the particular transaction in controversy ........
It
is essential that the witness should be, or profess to be, an expert
in the general subject under discussion. No acquaintance with
cognate pursuits will suffice, unless the matter inquired about is
common to both professions." The question under investigation in
this case was one of mental competency, and the physician called as
an expert expressly disclaimed being an expert in mental diseases,
and said that "he had not made such diseases the subject of special
study." His medical practice had apparently been confined to
the treatment of such diseases as ordinarily fall within the range of
a country practice.3 In a recent case arising in Texas, a practicing
I Rmerson v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 6 Allen 146.
Flnnegau v. Faill iver Gas Co., 159 Mass 311.
Russellv. State. 53 Miss. 367. See also Commonwealth v. Rieh, 14 Grav 335.
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physician in good standing and of large experience was called as an
expert to testify as to the effects upon the human system of a shock
from electricity. Upon the preliminary examination as to competency, it appeared that the physician had read the best authorities
upon the subject and knew what they said, but at the same time he
said that he was not an expert upon the subject and did not feel
qualified to give an opinion. A ruling of the trial court holding
him not qualified to speak as an expert was sustained.
"When a
witness," says the court, "states that he knows nothing about the
subject of inquiry, and that heis not qualified to give an opinion,
he should not be permitted to express any; for in order to say
something concerning a matter, the witness should know something.
* .

.

In the-case before us the witness had had no experi-

ence, and did not consider himself either an 'expert or qualified to
give an opinion. He only knew what the books said upon the subject. It was not sought to be shown that he had formed an opinion
from the books, or, if he had, what such opinion was. While an
expert may testify to an opinion of his own derived from books, for
one to do so, he must be an exper, and have an opinion of his own
upon the subject of inquiry. . . . Books of science and art are
not admissible in evidence to prove the opinions contained therein.
.

...

If they are not, how can one who knows their contents

but has formed no opinion of his own upon the subject under consideration, be allowed to testify to what the books say."'
The weight of authority is undoubtedly in favor of the rule that
the medical witness, if a regularly licensed physician, may testify
as ah expert upon a subject within the limits of his profession,
in regard to which he has had no professional experience and in
regard to which his knowledge has been derived wholly from books,
provided his knowledge is such as to enable him to form an independent opinion.2 The rule follows logically from the doctrine
that a license to practice authorizes the medical witness to speak
as an expert. It without doubt frequently results in injustice. But
it is a natural part of what may be called an expert testimony
scheme to which the profession for the present seems to be committed, a scheme that unfortunately casts upon jurors the chief
burden of responsibility.
[To be continued]

H. B. HUTCHMS
UNVzRSITY OtfMICmIGAN
I Wehuer & White v. Lagerfelt. 27 Texas Civ. App. 520.
2 See cases cited in note 2. 1. 612.
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